(1) With mathematical theories, we describe mathematical objects: numbers, sets, functions, models. The ontology of mathematical true statements is the domain of such kind of objects. The difference between mathematics and the other sciences is in the abstract nature of the mathematical domain.
(3) Mathematical knowledge is about something which is out of our mindis.
(4) Mathematical knowledge »supports« the possibility of having apriori knowledge about the mathematical ideal reality.
For Putnam, the characteristic example of Platonism in modern mathematics is Russell's program given in his Principia. Let us briefly consult this example, from Putnam's point of wiew.
Russell's understanding of the modus of existence of propositional functions, according to Putnam, completely »covering« his point No (2). Making efforts to found mathematics on the principles of logical rules, Russell treats deductive quantification theroy in connection with the rules of propositional functions as a way to found the theory of mathe matical entities. This way »logic« acquired a new content which, accor ding to Russell, guaranteed possibility of reducing all mathematics to logic. Russell described the concept of »propositional function« as a function whose values are propositinal; propositional function is iden tical with geting universals in intension. Or rather, propositional functions are in a one-to-one correspondence in relation to predicates. In »light« of the theory of realism of universals, predicates are under stand as real properties of mathematical objects. The ontology of mathe matical true statements covers the domain composed of the sequence of abstract levels.³ »Construction« of entities, which start from the zero level, include quantification theory and concept of identity. Basic enti ties are sets and individuals. Zero level demands logic of the first order, and the »construction« of complex numbers a logic of higher orders and predicates of the entities of zero level taken as arguments.⁴ The concept physical reality is not completely bifurcated from this idea. The mathematical, ideal, so to say, »object picture« is the ontological basis, essence of physical reality. This is a supplement on Plato's understanding of the theory of know ledge as the recollection of the world of ideas (anamnesis). But, that means: having knowledge about the essence of the physical world. Possibility of ap riori krowledge is extended to possibility of the apriori hnowlegde of the physical reality. ³ Russell's zero level is used as the collection of the simplest individu als (which are not sets) plus collection of all propositional functions is un derstood as arguments ,plus ...
It is possible to show that Russell really gave to this kind of mathema tic/logic the status of real existence with this quotation: »Every kind of knowledge is identification, maybe deceive, we must discover airitmetics as Colombus discovered West India, we don't create numbers more than he cre ated Indians.« Russell B. Is Position in Space and Time Absolute or Relat ive, Mind, nb. X, 1901. p. 312. ⁴ On the zero level, which is the frame for the tistinctive type of model, are individuals as the simplest »content« of mathematic/logic, which are de fined as the result of the use of the concept of identity and rules of quanti fication theory. (I. e. statement »there is y such that x is one X ,and y is one X, and x f y and for every r, if r i sone X than r = y or r = x.«) On the first level entities are sets whose members are entities of the zero level, RFFZd, 26(3) (1986/87)
»totality« as a property of really existing abstract entities Russell found in Principia in the frame of concepts: »totality of all predicates of integers«, »totality of all absolutely exsisting sets«. Such an antological status for the concept of the abstract mathematical entity is the result of, in Russell, the understanding of the concept of matematical model and especially standard mathematical model. Because of the unavoidable situation that the in Principia models are form ω-sequence Russell is forced to pressupose such properties as properties of undenumerable sets. He claims that such properies exist in the absolute sense of this concept; no matter that we are unable to produce evidence of these properties. Mathematical statements which refer to such predicates are, according to Russell, undubtely true. The truth value for these state ments depends on the possibility of having access to the consisency of the pressuposed model.⁵ Putnam's criticism of Russell's Platonism:
The basic criticism is in the direction of the criticism of the tota lity of the real existing predicates functions: »We do not speak of a number two (in Principia), but of the number two. This is in agreement with the idea that there is some one definite mdoel which is presuppo sed in number theory, and that even the substitution of an isomorphic model would be a change of subject m atter. . . Even if we took the numbers one, two, th ree,. . . as primitive (in direct violation of the Frege-Russell spirit), it would suffice to define 'A has n members' (where n is a variable over integers) to mean 'A can be put in one-to -one correspodence with the set of natural numbers less than n' (or alternatively, 'with the set of natural numbers from one through n). Then the equivalences P P discussed before would be forthcoming as theorems.«⁶ Putnam tried to reinterpret Russell's attitudes from his earlier work (which Putnam call if-thenism) in such a way that it is possible to understand the nature of the concept of number exusively from empi rical knowledge. This attitude of Russell is derived from the concept of identity and deductive rules of logic: »In order to solve this problem, let us abbreviate the statement 'the set of planets belongs to the num ber nine' as Pi, and the statement there is an x and there is an y a n d . . . such that x is a planet and y is a planet a n d . . . and x / y a n d . . . such that for every z if z is a planet then z = x o r ... , 'which expresses 'the number of planets is nine' in purely first order way, as P*. The equiva lence, P = P*, is a teorem of Principia, and hence holds in all models'. Thus, if we assume P r i n c i p i a has a model, it does not matter whether we assert P or P*. Otherwise, as we wish to say without com miting ourselves to sets, models, etc.«⁷ Putnam criticised Russell's later project, expresed in Principia, which includes the concept of set as Platonism using the same criticism of Russell's basic notion of propositional function: »A standard model is here defined as above: one in which each element bears a finite power of the successor relation to 'zero' where the meaning of 'finite' may vary with the model selected for the set theory.⁸ Putnam showed that the concept of »finite« really depends on the »kind« of selected model, on an empirical example: »And we can fix the notion of 'standard' model by taking this model to be the model. This is in effect what Kant did, but it is erroneus for just the reason that Kant' s views on geo metry are erroneus: because the cosmological properties of time in the large are not more a priori than those of space in the large«.⁹ Russell's concept of the »totality of sets« Putnam criticiesd in connection with the concept of undeterminateness: »Namely, there is a theorem of Prin cipia which says that there are non-denumerably many sets of integers. Hence there must be non-denumerably many sets of (integers (in any model). But this contradicts the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem, which says that Principia has a denumerable model (assuming Prineipia is consi stent !)«¹⁰ (II) Putnam's Proposal for Mathematics Let us briefly look at Putnam's proposal for mathematics without postulating an abstract »objects« with one of his examples.¹¹ This exam ple is in the function of his criticism of these philosophies which treat mathematics as a science with a special domain of act; respectively: » ... the idea that 'ontology' (i. e. the domain of the bound variables) in mathematically true statements is a domain of sets or numbers or fun ctions or other 'mathematical objects', and (moreover) that this is what distinguishes mathematics from other sciences is a widespread one.« ¹² And: »This idea lives in constant tension with the other idea, familiar since Frege and Russell, that there is no sharp separation to be made between logic and mathematics. Yet, logic, has no 'ontology' !«¹³ And from this follow: »It is precisely the chief characteristic of the princi ples and inference rules of logic that any domain of objects may be selected, and that any expressions may be instantiated for the predi cate letters and sentential letters that they contain.«¹⁴ It is not, accor- 
RFFZd, 26(3) (1986/87)
ding Putnam, very difficult to make this confirm with example, because: »In point of fact, it is not difficult to find mathematically true statements which quantify only over material objects, or over sensations, or over days of the week, or over whatever 'objects' you like: mathematically true statements about Turing machines, about Turing machines, about inscriptions, about maps, etc.«¹⁴ Example: Let T be a physically realized Turing machine, and let P₁, P₂, . . . Pn be predicates in ordinary language which describe its sta tes. To is completely characterized by finite set of such instructions (E. g. If x P₂ (T) and T is scanning the letter »y«, T w ill erase the »y« print »z« in its stead, shift one square left on the tape and then adjust itself so that P6 (T) in »nominalistic« language. Call that instructions I₁, I₂ . . . Ik. As long as I₁ and I₂ an d . . . and Ik, then T does not halt. Symbols I, II, III, IIII,. . . designate the numbers one, two, th re e . . . (i. e. the name of the number n is a string of n »I' s«). The sum of two numbers can be obtained by merely concatenating the numerals: nm is always the sum of n and m. The meaning of x = y+ is : »x equals y cubed«.
nx mean »x is a number«. ! (shriek) indicate absurdity. It is easily seen that! is a theorem of E. S. if and only if some cube is the sum of two cubes. Fermat proved that tins is impossible.
So, the following statement (we can call it statement*) is true: If X is any finite suquence of inscriptions in the alphabet I, ., = , + , !, N, and each member of X is either an inscription of NI or of a substi tution instance of one of the remaining above axioms, or comes from two preceding terms in the sequence by Detachment, then X does not contain!.
Possible objection to Putnam's attitude (that this example shows that mathematical true statements quantify only over physical objects) ¹⁴ ibid. p. 2. ¹⁵ ibid. p. 2.
is: even if some mathematical true statements quantify only over phy sical objects, still the proofs of these statements would refer at least to numbers, and hence to »mathematical objects«.
Putnam's response would be: The premise of this objection is false, because: if somebody wants to prove statement (which we call state ment*) he needs the principle of Mathematical Induction. But, this can be stated directly for finite inscriptions, and it can be perceived to be evidently true when so stated. It is not that one must state the prin ciple first for numbers and derive the principle for inscriptions via goedel numbering. This would assume that every inscription posseses a goedel number, which cannot be proved without assuming the principle for inscriptions. This is the principle stated as a rule of proof: If I, ., = , + , !, N are all P, and if for every x, if P(x) then P(xl), P ( x . ) . . . , P(xN), then, for every x, P(x).
There is no doubt that Putnam correctly shows that proofs of such statements as the stetament* is, (wich quantify only over physical objects as true mathematical statements), need only the principle of Mathematical Induction, and do not need mathematical objects. In other words : statement * as true mathematical statement refers only to phy sical objects (inscriptions) .
But, what is the significance (meaning) of the axioms of E. S. which enable such statements as statements* is?
What will happen if we omit the concept N (means: number) from the axioms of E. S. (i. e. from axiom 1. -which is: »I is number«, or from axiom 4. which is: »x is number which imply that x is equal with x«, etc.) ? Or, what will happen if we omit this concept N from the premises of the rule of proof (i. e. from the premise »P(N)« -which means: »if N are all P«, etc.)?
The answers are perhaps these: In that cases we will have the finite sequence of physical states (or physical objects) and »inscriptions« for objects (i. e. I, x -> xl, x -> x, I = x , . .. zi = Z₂ Z₃ -> !). But these are not even well formed formulas (i. e. x x l is either not a w ff -»x« being a term and not a propositio nal variable, or false). We conclude: It is necessary to interpret »x« as number if we to treat System E. S. as a part of mathematics. This example was supposed to be a example of mathematics which quantifies only over physical objects. But, it does not follow that mathematics can function without its proper objects; its »peculiar« elements. There would be no mathematics at all! Because: these elements belong to the »essen ce« of mathematics.
So, the situation is as follow:
We can allow that some mathematically possible true statements quantify only overe physical statements, or objects, but; -this doesn't entail at all: 1. that it is possible to identify mathematics with science of physi cal objects and states, 2. that it is possible to separate mathematics from its »peculiar« elements. They are an indispensable part of it.
(Ill)
Concluding remarks
So far we have shown that there is no possibility of mathematics without mathematical entities.
What could these entities possibly be? One answer is Platonistic. It seems natural and unavoidable, but 1 would like not to be constrained to accept it.
There is another, more exotic possibility -to treat mathematical knowledge as knowledge about some structures in our mind. Certainly, something in our brain organisation is responsable for our capacity to create mathematical theories. It is possible to understand mathematical theories as a body of knowledge which is an i n d i r e c t way »about« those structures?
(What do we simulate with computers? -Really not something which is out of our mind.) If this line of reasoning is correct, we would have a realism based on a physicalistic reduction of »mathematical« mental processes; to physicalistic reduction (physicalism) of »mathematical« mental processes to physiological processes. Certainly, such possibilities are distant and such assumptions far-fetched. Much more research is needed before we have a plausible answer. 
